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Abstract
This paper analyzes preferences in the presence of ambiguity that are rational in the
senseofsatisfyingtheclassicalorderingconditionaswellasmonotonicity. Undertechnical
conditions that are natural in an Anscombe-Aumann environment, we show that even for
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11 Introduction
Daniel Ellsberg’s seminal paper (1961) ignited a large and growing literature aimed at devel-




have demonstrated their usefulness.
More recently, several inﬂuential contributions have proposed decision models that over-
come speciﬁc perceived limitations of the CEU and MEU models. Two behavioral aspects have
received special attention. First, both the CEU and the MEU model satisfy Certainty Indepen-
dence: the main implication of this axiom is that preferences and, in particular, ambiguity atti-
tudes are unaffected by changes in the “scale” and “location” of utilities. To ﬁx ideas, suppose
the individual is risk-neutral, and assume that an individual is just indifferent between receiv-
ing $3 dollars for sure, and participating in a bet that yields $10 dollars if a certain ambiguous
event obtains, and 0 otherwise. Then, Certainty Independence also implies that the individual
would be indifferent: (i) between receiving $300 for sure, and participating in a bet that yields
$1,000 if the event obtains and 0 otherwise; and also (ii) between receiving $1,003 for sure and
participating in a bet that yields $1,010 if the event obtains and $1,000 otherwise. Analogies
with choice under risk suggest that subjects may reasonably violate either one or both of these
conclusions.
Second, the MEU model is characterized by a speciﬁc form of dislike for ambiguity, for-
malized by the “Uncertainty Aversion” axiom due to Schmeidler (1989). This axiom delivers
quasi-concavity of the functional representing preferences, and hence ensures a convenient
mathematical structure as shown by Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio
(2008). At the same time, this axiom imposes restrictions on preferences which one may want
to dispense with (see Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) for a theoretical discussion, or Baillon,
L’Haridon, and Placido (forthcoming) for an experimental perspective).
Recent decision-theoretic models relax the Certainty Independence and Uncertainty Aver-
sionaxiomsinspeciﬁcways. Forinstance,variationalpreferences(Maccheroni,Marinacci,and
2Rustichini, 2006) relax invariance to the scale of utilities, but retain invariance to their location,
as well as Uncertainty Aversion; the model studied by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008) drops Cer-
tainty Independence entirely, but retains Uncertainty Aversion; Grant and Polak (2007) instead
drop Certainty Independence, and weaken Uncertainty Aversion. Siniscalchi (2009) retains in-
variance to the location of utilities, but drops scale invariance, as well as Uncertainty Aversion
entirely.
ThispaperdropsbothCertaintyIndependenceandUncertaintyAversion. Weconsiderpref-
erences that only satisfy what in our view are the basic tenets of rationality under ambiguity:
weak order and monotonicity. We call these preferences rational. Since they are a weak order,
theyarerationalintheusualsenseofutilitytheory. Atthesametime,themonotonicityassump-
tion guarantees consistency with state-wise dominance, which in turn annihilates the relative
effects of ambiguity. All the models discussed above, and several others, belong to this class of
preferences. In particular, this class includes the MBC preferences introduced by Ghirardato
and Siniscalchi (2010, GS henceforth) and the Uncertainty Averse Preferences introduced by
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008).
We ﬁrst show that, for such preferences, a set of priors can be obtained following the ap-
proach of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004, GMM henceforth); i.e., as a represen-
tation of the derived unambiguous preference relation.1 Thus, in a speciﬁc behavioral sense,
one can identify probabilities that are signiﬁcant for the decision maker’s choices, regardless of
the representation of her preferences, which following GS we call “relevant priors.” We carry
on this task in an Anscombe-Aumann setting, and under two additional assumptions: Risk
Independence and Archimedean continuity. We call the rational preferences satisfying these
additional axioms MBA preferences (for Monotonic, Bernoullian, and Archimedean). We thus
directly generalize the results of GMM and Nehring (2002), and provide a basis over which both
the analysis of GS and most results of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2008, C3M henceforth) rest.
We then leverage this general representation result to analyze the individual’s perception of
ambiguity and her attitudes toward it. MBA preferences provide a relatively “neutral” ground
1Nehring(2001)andGilboa,Maccheroni,Marinacci,andSchmeidler(2010)deriveasetofpriorsfromaseparate
relation, which they interpret as embodying “objective rationality,” and impose consistency conditions between
such relation on the decision maker’s preference relation.
3for the study of these issues, precisely because they do not incorporate any speciﬁc assumption
about invariance and/or attitudes toward ambiguity. We show that MBA preferences admit a
“generalized Hurwicz (or -MEU) representation,” thus extending an analogous result estab-
lished by GMM for preferences satisfying Certainty Independence. This representation pro-
videsausefultooltostudy,forinstance,comparativeambiguityattitudes. Then,wediscusstwo
different notions of ambiguity aversion and the relations between them. Finally, we propose a
behavioral deﬁnition of unambiguous acts, and characterize it in terms of the set of priors we
identify. We then deﬁne unambiguous events, and again provide a functional characterization.
Related literature
As outlined above, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) showing that the (arguably)
most general rationality assumptions for choice under ambiguity guarantee the existence of a
set of priors, ﬁrst envisioned by Ellsberg (1961) and modeled in the seminal papers of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (2002); 2) the discussion of ambiguity attitudes in such gen-
eral context; 3) the characterization of unambiguous acts and events and some consequences
thereof.
In respect to the ﬁrst contribution, our debt to the GMM paper is obvious. The added con-
tribution here is clearly in showing how (most of) the representation results of that paper gen-
eralize to rational preferences which do not satisfy Certainty Independence, but only Risk Inde-
pendence. The GS paper is complementary to the present one. Its main focus is the characteri-
zation of the set of relevant priors for popular preference models. Such characterizations hinge
on a differential result which requires a stronger continuity condition, and thus applies only to
a subset of MBA preferences, which GS dub MBC (where C stands for “[Cauchy] continuous”).
TheC3Mpaperisalsocomplementarytothepresentone, becauseitsmainfocusistheanalysis
of rational preferences which also satisfy Schmeidler’s “Uncertainty Aversion” axiom. C3M also
characterize the set of relevant priors in several ways (but, their differential characterization is
different from the one in GS).
The discussion on ambiguity attitudes is also related to earlier work. We show how the ideas
inGhirardatoandMarinacci(2002)canbeextendedtotheMBAclassofpreferences. Wereferto
4that paper for detailed discussion on the relation of such vision of ambiguity aversion to those
spoused in other papers, in particular Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein (1999).
As to this paper’s third contribution, this paper comes within a well established literature.
Early attempts to characterize behaviorally ambiguity were focussed on ambiguity of events in
speciﬁc preference models. Such is the case of Nehring (1999) and Zhang (2002), which con-
sider CEU preferences. Subsequently, Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Nehring (2001) offered
deﬁnitions of unambiguous event which apply in principle to any preference, providing a char-
acterizationoverrichstatespaces. Nehring’sproposalisparticularlyrelevanttoourpapersince
it can be shown to be equivalent to the one offered here. The Epstein-Zhang deﬁnition, on the
other hand, is markedly different from ours. We refer the reader to section 5.3, and especially to
Nehring (2006) and Amarante and Filiz (2007) for discussion on the relations between the def-
inition of unambiguous event presented here, Zhang’s and Epstein-Zhang’s. To the best of our
knowledge, the only previous paper that provides a deﬁnition of unambiguous act as primitive,
and events as derivative, is Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). However, their deﬁnition only ap-
plies to preferences which are ambiguity averse (or loving) according to the deﬁnition in that
paper. For such preferences, the deﬁnition of unambiguous act offered in the two papers can
be shown to coincide.
Finally, some of the consequences that we draw from our deﬁnitions of ambiguity owe to
previous work, and our debts and contributions are clearly identiﬁed in the respective sections.
2 Notation and preliminaries
We consider a state spaceS, endowed with an algebra . The notation B0(, ) indicates the set
of simple –measurable real functions on S with values in the interval2    R, endowed with
the topology induced by the supremum norm; for simplicity, write B0(,R) as B0().
Thesetofﬁnitelyadditiveprobabilitiesonisdenotedba1(). The(relative)weak topology
on ba1() is the topology induced by B0() or, equivalently, by B().
A functional I : B0(, )!R is:
2Which may be open or closed on the left or right, and may also be unbounded on one or both sides.
5 monotonic if I(a) I(b) for all a b
 continuous if it is sup-norm continuous
 normalized if I(1S)= for all 2 
Next, ﬁx a convex subset X of a vector space. (Simple) acts are -measurable functions
f :S ! X such that f (S) = ff (s) : s 2Sg is ﬁnite; the set of all (simple) acts is denoted by F. We
deﬁnemixturesofactspointwise: forany2[0,1], f +(1 )g istheactthatdeliverstheprize
f (s)+(1 )g(s) in state s. Given f ,g 2 F and A 2 , we denote by f A g the act in F which
yields f (s) for s 2A and g(s) for s 2Ac S nA.
3 Rational preferences and relevant priors: characterizations
In this section we ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce our basic assumptions on preferences, characterizing
whatweearlierdubbedthe“MBA”model. (WereferthereadertoGSandC3Mformoredetailed
discussionoftheaxioms.) ThenweshowthatforMBApreferencestheunambiguouspreference
relation introduced by GMM can be used to obtain a set of possible probabilistic models of the
decision problem that might be employed by the decision maker the relevant priors.
3.1 Axioms
The main object of interest is a bynary relation ¼ on F. As usual,  (resp. ) denotes the
asymmetric (resp. symmetric) component of ¼, and we abuse notation by identifying the prize
x and the constant act that delivers x for every s.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) The relation ¼ is nontrivial, complete, and transitive on F.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) If f ,g 2F and f (s)¼ g(s) for all s 2S then f ¼ g.
Thesetwoaxiomsdeﬁnerationalpreferences. NexttwoaxiomsaretailoredtotheAnscombe-
Aumann setup we are considering.
Axiom 3 (Risk Independence) If x,y,z 2 X and  2 (0,1] then x  y implies x + (1   )z 
y +(1 )z.
6Axiom 4 (Archimedean) If f ,g,h 2 F and f  g  h then there are , 2 (0,1) such that f +
(1 )h  g  f +(1 )h.
As it is well-known, the above two axioms, in addition to the ones characterizing rational
preferences, imply the existence of:
 a Bernoulli utility index on X; that is, u :X !R which is afﬁne and represents the restric-
tion of ¼ to X;
 the existence of certainty equivalents x f for all acts f 2F.
A binary relation ¼ on F that satisﬁes Axioms 1–4 will henceforth be called an MBApreference
(for Monotonic, Bernoullian, Archimedean).
We now provide a basic representation result for the preferences satisfying the above ax-
ioms. It generalizes previous results of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), GMM, GS and C3M,
which all impose more stringent axiomatic requirements on preferences.
Proposition 1 A preference relation ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 1–4 if and only if there exists a non-
constant, afﬁne function u : X ! R and a monotonic, normalized, continuous functional I :
B0(,u(X))!R such that for all f ,g 2F
f ¼ g () I(u  f ) I(u  g). (1)
Moreover, if (Iv,v) also satisﬁes Eq. (1), and Iv : B0(,v(X)) ! R is normalized, then there are
,2R with >0 such that v(x)=u(x)+ for all x 2X, and Iv(b)=I( 1[b  ])+ for all
b 2 B0(,v(X)).
ObservethatdifferentlyfromLemma1inGMM,thefunctional I isnotnecessarilyconstant-
linear.3 I therefore depends upon the normalization chosen for the utility function (see Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2005)). On the other hand, thanks to normalization, I is



















3I is constant-linear if and only if I(a +1S) = I(a)+ for all a 2 B0(,u(X)), , 2 R,  > 0, such that
a +1S 2 B0(,u(X)).
73.2 Relevant priors and unambiguous preferences
We now recall GMM’s notion of “unambiguous preference” relation (see also Nehring, 2007).
The more general preference setting notwithstanding, such relation has the same interpreta-
tion as in GMM: since ambiguity sensitivity may lead to violations of the Anscombe-Aumann
independence axiom, we look for rankings that are not reversed by mixtures.
Deﬁnition 1 Let f ,g 2 F. We say that f is unambiguously preferred to g, denoted f ¼ g, if
and only if, for all h 2F and all 2(0,1], f +(1 )h ¼g +(1 )h.
The relation ¼ enjoys the properties identiﬁed by GMM (see their Props. 4 and 5), and
hence, as in GMM, it admits a representation à la Bewley (2002) (cf. e.g. GMM Prop. A.2):
Proposition 2 ForanyMBApreference¼, thereexistsanon-empty, unique, convexandweak-




u  f dP 
Z
u  g dP for all P 2C,
where u is the function obtained in Proposition 1. Moreover, C is independent of the choice of
normalization of u.
The last sentence —which follows from the structure of the Bewley-style representation and
the uniqueness of C given u— shows that C is cardinally invariant, even though I is not.
Thus, the unambiguous preference gives rise to a set of priors, which GMM interpret as the
(subjective) ambiguity revealed by the decision maker’s preferences. We refer the reader to that
paper for discussion of the appropriateness of such interpretation.
GS propose a behavioral deﬁnition of the set of priors that are relevant for the individual’s
primitive preference relation ¼; they then show that the resulting set is precisely C, and also
show that the arguments provided by GMM in support of their interpretation of C as revealed
ambiguity extend to the preferences they study. We refer the interested reader to GS for details;
we shall sometimes implicitly invoke GS’ equivalence result and thus refer to C as the set of
“relevant priors.”
84 A generalized Hurwicz representation
We now turn to the ﬁrst consequence of the general representation results of the previous sec-
tion. We show that that the generalized -MEU representation suggested by GMM, which is in
the spirit of Hurwicz’s “pessimism index” model Hurwicz (1951), extends to MBA preferences,
andsodoesitsinterpretationintermsofcomparativeambiguity. Thus,throughoutthissection,
¼isanMBApreference,representedbythepair(I,u)asperProposition1andwithrelevantpri-
ors C as per Proposition 2.
We ﬁrst introduce convenient notation. For any measure Q 2 ba1() and function a 2
B(), let Q(a) =
R
a dQ. Also, given a weak closed set D  ba1() and function a 2 B(), let
D(a) = minQ2DQ(a) and D(a) = maxQ2DQ(a); note that D (resp. D) is a monotonic, normal-
ized, constant-linear and concave (resp. convex) functional on B(). We then get the following
immediate Corollary of the previous representation results.






A second piece of terminology is useful. GMM deem an act crisp if, intuitively, it cannot be
used to hedge the ambiguity of any other act. GMM formalize this intuition via a behavioral
condition that indirectly relies upon Certainty Independence; since MBA preferences do not
necessarily satisfy this property, we require a slightly stronger deﬁnition: we deem an act crisp
if it is unambiguously indifferent to a constant.4 Formally, denote by  the symmetric compo-
nent of ¼. Then, the act f 2 F is crisp if there is x 2 X such that f  x (that is, for all g 2 F
and  2 [0,1], f +(1 )g  x +(1 )g). The characterization of crispness in terms of C
follows.
Corollary 4 An act f 2F is crisp if and only ifC(u  f )=C(u  f ).
We can now provide the sought generalized -MEU representation. Given a normalized
representation (I,u) of an MBA preference ¼, deﬁne an ambiguityindex : Bb(,u(X))!R by
4For GMM’s preferences the two conditions are equivalent: this follows immediately from Corollary 4 below






foreverynon-crispfunctiona 2 Bb(,u(X)); byconvention,let(a)=
1
2 foreverycrispfunction
a. The following result is then immediately proved.
Proposition 5 Let ¼ be an MBA preference. Then there exist a non-empty, weak–closed, and
convexsetC ba1(),anon-constant,afﬁnefunctionu :X !R,andafunction: Bb(,u(X))!
[0,1] such that (i) for all f ,g 2F,
f ¼ g () (u f )C(u f )+[1 (u f )]C(u f )(u g)C(u g)+[1 (u g)]C(u g)
and (ii) u and C represent ¼ in the sense of Prop. 2. Furthermore, for all non-crisp functions
a,b 2 Bb(,u(X)), if P(a)=P(b) for all P 2C, then (a)=(b).
Finally, if (u 0,C 0,0) also satisfy (i) and (ii), then C 0 =C, u 0(x) = u(x)+ for some , 2 R
with >0, and 0(a +)=(a) for all non-crisp a 2 Bb(,u(X)).
Remark 4.1 The uniqueness statement in Proposition 5 may be paraphrased as follows: C is
unique, u is cardinally unique, and if the ambiguity index () is viewed as a function of acts,
rather than of utility proﬁles, then it is also unique (for non-crisp acts). More precisely, it is
invariant to cardinal transformations of the utility function u. It is worth recalling that GMM
deﬁne the ambiguity index () over (equivalence classes of) acts, rather than functions.
Since the functional I derived in Proposition 1 is not necessarily constant-linear, the func-
tional  does not have the same structure as in GMM. There, it is shown that, for any two acts
f ,g 2 F, (u  f ) = (u  g) holds if, for every P,Q 2 C, P(u  f )  Q(u  f ) if and only if
P(u  g)  Q(u  g). For MBA preferences such equality only obtains under the more restric-
tive condition that P(u  f )=P(u  g) for every P 2C.
4.1 Ambiguity aversion
Here we consider the characterization of ambiguity attitudes for MBA preferences. We ﬁrst
show that, as it transpired from our choice of terminology, and consistently with the analysis in
GMM, the function  can be interpreted as an index of ambiguity aversion: The higher (u  f )
10is, the more averse to the ambiguity entailed by f is the decision maker. “More averse to am-
biguity” here is in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002, to which the reader is referred
for explanation and discussion; GM henceforth): We say that preference ¼1 is more averse to
ambiguity than ¼2 if for all f 2F and all x 2X, f ¼1 x implies f ¼2 x. The comparison is made
betweenpreferenceswhichdisplaythesamerelevantpriorsC andutilityu,orequivalently(see
GMM, Proposition 6, which generalizes immediately to our case), for any f ,g 2F,
f ¼

1 g () f ¼

2 g (3)
We then immediately obtain:5
Proposition 6 (GMM, Proposition 12) Let ¼1 and ¼2 be MBA preferences, and suppose that ¼1
and ¼2 reveal identical ambiguity. Then ¼1 is more ambiguity averse than ¼2 if and only if for
any common utility u, 1(u  f )2(u  f ) for any noncrisp f 2F.
Notice that, since as observed the function  may not be independent of the choice of the
normalization of utility, here we ﬁrst normalize the two utility functions to be identical,6 and
then perform the comparison of the  functions.
Turning to an absolute notion of ambiguity aversion, we recall that GM (in this differing
from Epstein (1999), see the discussion in their paper) suggest using subjective expected util-
ity preferences as a benchmark for ambiguity neutrality, and propose the following axiomatic
deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion:
Axiom 5 (Ambiguity Aversion) There exists a SEU preference ¾ that agrees with ¼ on X and
such that, for all f 2F and x 2X,
f ¼x =) f ¾x
That is, a preference is ambiguity averse if it is more ambiguity averse than some SEU pref-
erence that displays the same risk attitudes.7
5Here and henceforth, for results which are straightforward extension of existing results we omit the proof and
provide a reference to the existing result.
6Eq. (3) implies that the Bernoullian utilities are cardinally equivalent, thus equality of utility is w.l.o.g.
7To further clarify, we consider SEU preferences à la Anscombe-Aumann, rather than à la Savage.
11The characterization of ambiguity aversion given by GM immediately generalizes to MBA
preferences. A piece of terminology ﬁrst. Given an MBA preference with a representation (I,u),
deﬁne
Core(I)=fP 2ba1() : 8a 2 B0(,u(X)), I(a)P(a)g and
Eroc(I)=fP 2ba1() : 8a 2 B0(,u(X)), I(a)P(a)g.
These correspond to the game-theoretic notions when the preference is CEU, but not other-
wise. Absolute ambiguity aversion corresponds to non-emptiness of Core(I). (The symmetric
property of ambiguity love is analogously characterized as nonemptiness of Eroc(I).)
Proposition 7 (GM, Theorem 12) Let¼beanMBApreferenceand(I,u)arepresentationinthe
sense of Prop. 1. Then ¼ is ambiguity averse if and only if Core(I)6=;.
The GM proposal is not the most popular deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion in the literature.
The following notion, proposed by Schmeidler (1989), claims that title. It imposes convexity of
preferences.8
Axiom 6 (Convexity) If f ,g 2F and 2(0,1) then
f  g =)f +(1 )g ¼ f .
These two notions of aversion to ambiguity are a priori different. Indeed, GM present an
example (Example 25) of an ambiguity averse MBA preference which is not convex, while the
following is an example of a convex MBA preference which is not ambiguity averse.
Example 1 Suppose X =R and considerS =fs1,s2g. Further, suppose  is the power set. Then,
we can identify each element P 2ba1() with the number P(fs1g). For this reason, without loss
of generality, we use P for either the number and the probability distribution. Next, consider






















8Schmeidler calls this property “uncertainty aversion,” while GM call it “ambiguity hedging.”
12where c1,c2 : ba1() ! R are such that c1(P) =
P+1
2 and c2(P) = 1+P. It is immediate to see that
c1 is afﬁne and continuous and c2 is afﬁne and continuous. Note also that u does not appear
because it is the identity. Moreover, minP2ba1()c1(P) =
1
2 > 0 and maxP2ba1()c1(P) = 1 while
minP2ba1()c2(P) = 1. By C3M (Corollary 22), ¼ is an MBA preference that satisﬁes convexity.
However,inlightofthediscussioninCerreia-Vioglio,Maccheroni,Marinacci,andMontrucchio
(2009), ¼ is ambiguity averse only if argmaxc1 \argminc2 6= ?, which is clearly not satisﬁed in
our case.
However, thenextresultshowsthataconnectionexistsbetweenthetwonotionsofaversion
toambiguity: convexityamountstoambiguityaversion holding“locally”foreveryact. Forcon-
venience, we restrict attention to MBA preferences for which there is no worst consequence:
that is, for every x 2X there is y 2X such that x y. Given a representation (I,u) as in Prop. 1,
this is equivalent to the condition that infx2X u(x)62u(X).9
Theorem 8 For an MBA preference ¼ that has no worst consequence, the following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) ¼ is convex
(ii) for each f 2F, there is a SEU preference ¾f such that, for all g 2 F,
f ¾f g =) f ¼ g
In view of Theorem 8, Axiom 6 implies the following weak version of Axiom 5: at each x 2X
there is a SEU preference ¾x such that, for all g 2 F,
x ¾x g =)x ¼ g.
Relative to Axiom 5, here the SEU preference ¾x depends onx. Hence, Axiom 6 actually implies
Axiom 5 for all preferences where this dependence can be removed. It is useful to reformulate
this condition by introducing the sets
S¼(x)=

¾: for all g 2F, x ¾ g )x ¼ g
	
8x 2X.
9This does not imply that u(X) must be unbounded below: e.g. consider X =(0,1) and u(x)=x.
13In other words, S¼(x) is the collection of all SEU preferences that are more uncertainty averse





6 implies Axiom 5.
4.2 Does B stand for Biseparable?
MBA preferences share some of the properties of what Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) call
“biseparable” preferences. In our context, a preference ¼ is biseparable if there exists a unique
capacity  :  ! R such that, given any representation (I,u) of ¼, with I normalized, we have
for any binary act x Ay with x y,
I(u (x Ay))=u(x)(A)+u(y)(1 (A)). (4)
Biseparability thus requires that the “decision weight” attached to the event A in the evaluation
of any bet x Ay be independent of the prizes x and y (provided x y). Also observe that bisep-
arability is a property of preferences, not of their representation: Eq. (4) is equivalent to the
requirement that x Ay (A)x +[1 (A)]y, where the r.h.s. of this indifference is a mixture of
the prizes x and y. Hence, the capacity  is also independent of the choice of u.10
Itisnothardtoseethatingeneral, MBApreferencesmayfailtobebiseparable, eventhough
they induce a cardinal and afﬁne utility u. The following example illustrates.
Example 2 On an arbitrary state spaceS and X =R+, consider a smooth-ambiguity preference
with u(x) = x, (fQ1g) = (fQ2g) =
1
2 with Q1(fAg) = Q2(fAg) =
3
4 for some event A 2 , and





2 logQ2(a) foralla 2 Bb(,R+).
10Consequently, under biseparability, the restriction of the normalized functional I to binary acts is also inde-
pendent of u, even though, for general acts, this is not generally the case. As it is argued in Ghirardato et al. (2005),
I is invariant with respect to u for all acts f in our Anscombe-Aumann framework only if we assume that the
preference satisﬁes Certainty Independence.












Thus, if we apply Eq. (4) to the bet 1A0, we conclude that (A) equals 0.43301; however, if we
consider the bet 2A1 instead, Eq. (4) implies that (A) should be 0.47902: contradiction.
We therefore see that in this case (A) cannot be deﬁned independently of the choice of
x  y, a violation of biseparability. Intuitively, since () = log() displays decreasing absolute
ambiguity aversion, as we increase the prizes involved, we get a less conservative willingness to
bet on the ambiguous event A.
While invariance of I and  to transformations of the utility function does not obtain, for
MBApreferenceswecanstillobtaina“locally”biseparablerepresentationof¼, inthefollowing
sense. Fix a pair (I,u) that represents ¼, with I normalized. Given a bet x Ay on an event A 2
(with x y), deﬁne
x,y(A)(u x Ay)(C(1A0) C(1A0))+C(1A0); (5)
The uniqueness properties of the ambiguity index () ensure that the quantity x,y is inde-
pendent of the utility function adopted (cf. Proposition 5). It is then easy to verify that, when
restricted to binary acts (bets) of the form x Ay (for arbitrary A 2 ), the preference ¼ has the
representation
I(u (x Ay))=u(x)x,y(A)+u(y)(1 x,y(A)) (6)
With this notation, an MBA preference is biseparable if x,y does not depend upon x and
y; we may call such a preference MBis, for Monotone and Biseparable. It is natural to ask if an
additional axiom identiﬁes the MBis subclass of MBA preferences. Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2001) describe and axiomatize a model of preferences that turns out to have exactly the type of
separability we need. The main axiom is the following; recall that an act f 2 F is binary iff it is
of the form f =x Ay for some A 2 and x,y 2X (not necessarily distinct or strictly ranked).
15Axiom 7 (Binary Certainty Independence) For all f ,g 2 F, with f ,g binary acts, x 2 X, and
2(0,1]: f  g if and only if f +(1 )x g +(1 )x.
We then have the following characterization; see also Theorem 9 in Ghirardato and Mari-
nacci (2001).
Proposition 9 An MBA preference ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 7 if and only if it is biseparable.
5 Ambiguity of acts and events
This section contains the main contributions of this paper. We ﬁrst propose a notion of unam-
biguous acts which strengthens that of crisp acts (cf. §4), and characterize it for MBA prefer-
ences. Second, we employ this notion to deﬁne unambiguous events, and again provide char-
acterizations. Armed with the characterization of unambiguous acts and events for MBA pref-
erences, we proceed to investigate some consequences of such characterizations. In particu-
lar, we observe how, in the spirit of Epstein and Zhang (2001), the derived set of unambiguous
events can be used to provide a “fully subjective” theory of expected utility (different from the
one they propose). We ﬁnally generalize Marinacci (2002)’s result on the consistency of proba-
bilistic sophistication and ambiguity aversion to non (-)MEU preferences.
Throughout this section, it is convenient to adopt an explicit notation for simple acts. Fix
a ﬁnite partition fE1,...,Eng of S in , and corresponding prizes x1,...,xn 2 X. The act that
delivers prize xi in states s 2 Ei, for i =1,...,n, will be denoted by fx1,E1;...;xn,Eng. As before,
if n =2, then fx1,E;x2,S nEg will be denoted simply by x1E x2
5.1 Unambiguous acts
We begin by motivating our deﬁnition of unambiguous acts. In keeping with the intuition that
ambiguity is revealed by non-neutral attitudes toward hedging, a starting point is to require
that unambiguous acts be crisp. To elaborate, we surely want the set of unambiguous acts to
include all constant acts; it then seems plausible to require that this set also include acts that,
like constants, are revealed not to provide any hedging opportunities.
16However, we would like the notion of unambiguous acts to capture an additional intuition.
Consider the three-color Ellsberg urn, containing 30 red balls and 60 green and blue balls, in
unspeciﬁed proportions. It is natural to regard a “bet on red” as an unambiguous act, because
the partition of the state space S = fr,g,bg it induces—the winning event frg and the losing
event fg,bg—consists of events whose relative likelihood is intuitively clear. But, by the same
token, a “bet on not red” should also be regarded as unambiguous.
More broadly, if two acts f ,g induce the same partition of the state space S, in the sense
that, as usual, for all states s,s0 2 S, f (s) = f (s0) if and only if g(s) = g(s0), then either they
are both ambiguous, or else they are both unambiguous. In other words, the property of being
ambiguousorunambiguousdependsuponthepartitionanactinduces,ratherthanonthespe-
ciﬁc assignment of distinct prizes to different elements of the induced partition. The following
example demonstrates that this additional, natural requirement has bite.
Example 3 LetS =fs1,s2,s3g, and consider the setC generated by the priors P =[1=3,1=4,5=12]
and Q = [1=4,5=12,1=3] and the act f = fx,fs1g;y,fs2g;z,fs3gg, with u(x) = 1, u(y) = 4, u(z) =
7. Observe that P(u  f ) = Q(u  f ), so f is crisp (cf. Corollary 4). However, the act g =
fy,fs1g;z,fs2g;x,fs3gg, which “permutes” the payoffs delivered by f but is measurable with re-
spect to the same partition, satisﬁes P(u  g)6=Q(u  g): hence, it is not crisp.
Now, if unambiguous acts must be crisp (as we wish to assume), then g must be deemed
ambiguous. Since f and g induce the same partition ofS, the preceding argument then implies
that we must deem f ambiguous as well.
Observe that, in Example 3, the prizes delivered by the acts f and g are the same; this is the
sense in which g is a “permutation” of f . We formalize this notion of permutation below.
The discussion so far suggests the following loose provisional deﬁnition: an act is unam-
biguous if all its “permutations” are crisp. However, a ﬁnal difﬁculty must be overcome. Acts
map states to consequences; on the other hand, hedging considerations involve utility trade-
offs. Hence, if we deem f unambiguous, and f (s)  g(s) for all s 2 S, we should deem g un-
ambiguous, too. Indeed, it turns out that, in the approach we pursue, this is necessary, not just
natural, in order to avoid paradoxical conclusions:
17Example 4 Consider again the 3-color Ellsberg urn, with S = fr,g,bg; consider prizes x,y,z
with x 6= y 6= z and u(x) = 1 > 0 = u(y) = u(z), and let f = fx,frg;y,fgg;z,fbgg, so f is, in-
tuitively, a bet on red, even though strictly speaking it is not a binary act. Finally, consider the
set C generated by P = [1=3,2=3,0] and Q = [1=3,0,2=3]. In keeping with the Ellsbergian in-
tuition, we wish to deem f unambiguous; however, consider the act f 0 = fy,frg;x,fgg;z,fbgg,
which delivers the same prizes as f and is measurable with respect to the same partition. Then
P(u  f 0)=
2
3 >0=Q(u  f 0), so f 0 is not crisp.
As in the previous example, f 0 must be deemed ambiguous, and hence our provisional def-
inition would deem f ambiguous as well, which seems counterintuitive.
Our deﬁnition of unambiguous act takes care of the difﬁculty illustrated in Example 4 by
deﬁning permutations in terms of utility levels instead of payoffs.
Deﬁnition 2 An act g 2F is a ¼-permutation of another act f 2F if:
(i) 8s 2S there is s0 2S such that f (s) g(s0);
(ii) 8s 2S there is s0 2S such that g(s) f (s0);
(iii) for all s,s0 2S, f (s) f (s0) if and only if g(s) g(s0).
Anact f 2F isunambiguousifevery¼-permutationof f iscrisp. Theclassofallunambiguous
acts is denoted by U.
Note that, if preferences are represented by a Bernoulli utility u on X, then conditions (i) and
(ii) above are equivalent to the statement that u  f (S)=u  g(S).
The following result shows that the set U is the largest set of crisp acts which is “closed”
with respect to ¼-permutations.
Proposition 10 Given an MBA preference ¼, U is the largest set of crisp acts such that if f 2U
and g 2F is a ¼-permutation of f , then g 2U.
The main result of this section shows that unambiguous acts have a sharp characterization
in terms of their expected utility with respect to probabilities in the set C:
Theorem 11 For any f 2F, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f 2U.
18(ii) P(fs : f (s)xg)=Q(fs f (s)xg) for all x 2X, P,Q 2C.
(iii) P(fs :u  f (s)g)=Q(fs :u  f (s)g) for all 2R, P,Q 2C.
(iv) P(fs u  f (s)=g)=Q(fs :u  f (s)=g) for all 2R, P,Q 2C.
Statement (ii) is possibly the most useful, and powerful, characterization of unambiguous
acts. In words, an act is unambiguous if and only if the events in the partition it induces have
the same probability according to all members of the set C. This in particular implies that, if f
is unambiguous and g induces the same partition as f , but possibly delivers entirely different
prizes, then g is also unambiguous.
5.2 Unambiguous events
It is natural to deﬁne unambiguous any event with respect to which unambiguous acts are
measurable (a similar approach to deﬁning unambiguous events was earlier advocated by Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002)).
Deﬁnition 3 The class of unambiguous events is
=





for unambiguous events. The ﬁrst is a behavioral result:
Proposition 12 For any A 2, A 2 if and only if for any x y, the act x Ay is crisp.
By part (ii) of Theorem 11, arguing as we did after the statement of that Theorem, the quan-
tiﬁer “for all x  y” could be changed to “for some x  y” without invalidating the result. This
makes the behavioral identiﬁcation of the set  conceptually easier, and it also conforms with
our intuition that ambiguity is a property of the event partition the act is based on.
Thus, an event A is unambiguous if it is such that any bet on such event —i.e., any act of the
form x Ay for x  y— cannot be used to hedge the ambiguity in another act (Nehring (2001)
proposes a different deﬁnition which turns out to be equivalent to Def. 3, and hence also to an
19earlier one he presented in Nehring (1999)). Conversely, A is ambiguous if x Ay 6 z for any z 2
X; that is, ifx Ay z, then there exist 2(0,1], g 2F such that x Ay +(1 )g 6z +(1 )g.
The second result shows that unambiguous events have a simple and intuitive characteri-
zation in terms of the probabilities in C. (Notice that this is independent of the normalization
chosen for u.) There is also a natural connection with the “local” willingness to bet x,y deﬁned
in Eq. (6).
Proposition 13 For any A 2 , A 2  if and only if P(A) = Q(A) = x,y(A) for all P,Q 2 C and
x,y 2X.
As a consequence, for all MBA preferences, the collection  has a simple and intuitive struc-
ture (cf. Zhang (2002) and Nehring (1999)).
Corollary 14  is a (ﬁnite) -system. That is: 1)S 2 ; 2) if A 2  then Ac 2 ; 3) if A,B 2  and
A \ B =; then A [ B 2.
It is natural to surmise that any act whose upper level sets are unambiguous events should
be deemed unambiguous (cf., e.g., Epstein and Zhang (2001)). Proposition 13, paired with The-
orem 10, allows us to show that this is indeed the case.
Corollary 15 For any act f 2 F, f 2 U if and only if its upper preference sets fs 2S : f (s) ¼ xg
belong to  for all x 2X.
Nehring (1999) shows that, if S is ﬁnite and I is a Choquet integral (so that the set C can
be simply characterized; see Example 17 in GMM), the set  can be further characterized as
follows:
=fA 2:(B)=(B \A)+(B \A
c) for all B 2g,
where  = x,y, which in the CEU case is independent of the choice of x and y. It follows that
for CEU preferences  is an algebra, a result that shows that such preferences cannot be used to
model some potentially interesting ambiguity situations (see for instance the 4-color example
in Zhang (2002)).
205.2.1 Ambiguity and willingness to bet
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) propose a behavioral notion of unambiguous event for a sub-
classofthebiseparablepreferencesmentionedinSection4.2,showingthatithasasimplechar-
acterizationtermsofthewillingnesstobetset-function ofEq.(4): anevent B isunambiguous
in their sense if and only if (B)+(Bc)=1.
The deﬁnition given above enjoys two main advantages over this earlier proposal: it is more
general,becauseitappliestoanyMBApreference,and,moreimportantly,itismoreaccurate,as
itallowstodistinguishbetweeneventswhicharetruly(perceived)unambiguousandthosethat
appear to be because of the behavior of the decision maker’s ambiguity attitude. The following
result illustrates this point. Recall that x,y() of Eq. (6) is the local willingness-to-bet index
deﬁned in Eq. (6), and () is the the ambiguity index of Eq. (2).
Proposition 16 Given an MBA preference with normalized representation (I,u) and any x,y 2
X such that x y, the following are equivalent for any A 2:
(i) x,y(A)+x,y(Ac)=1 (x,y is complement-additive)
(ii) either A 2, or A 2n and (u x Ay)+(u x Ac y)=1
To interpret, an event satisﬁes the condition x,y(A)+x,y(Ac) = 1 for some x and y (which
is the natural generalization of the Ghirardato-Marinacci condition to MBA preferences) in
exactly two cases: either 1) A is unambiguous, or 2) A is not unambiguous, but the decision
maker’s ambiguity index in evaluating the bets x Ay and x Ac y behaves so as to perfectly com-
pensate the ambiguity aversion (resp. appeal) revealed in evaluating x Ay by evaluating the
complementary bet x Ac y in an ambiguity seeking (resp. averse) fashion. That is, x,y(A) +
x,y(Ac) = 1 could be satisﬁed by a pure mathematical accident, if the decision maker’s ambi-
guity attitude is “inconsistent” in just the right way.
On the other hand, suppose that the preference satisﬁes (for the given x and y) for every
A 2n,
(u x Ay)+(u x A
c y)6=1 (7)
Then x,y(A)+x,y(Ac) = 1 if and only if A is unambiguous. For instance, this is the case of a
21decision maker for whom  > 1=2 uniformly. The following example shows one case of such
consistency of ambiguity aversion with CEU preferences.
Example 5 Consider the following variant of the Ellsberg “3-color” paradox. An urn contains
120 balls, 30 of which are red, while the remaining 90 are either blue, green or yellow. A decision
makerfacingthisproblemhasaCEUpreference¼representedbya(non-constantandconvex-
















Observe ﬁrst that Core() contains (at least) the uniform probability on S. Therefore, ¼ is
ambiguity averse in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), though  is not supermod-
ular. Observe next that (frg) = 1=4 and (fg,b,yg) = 3=4. That is ffrg,fg,b,ygg is a candi-
date for being an unambiguous partition. According to Proposition 16, this will be the case if
(frg)+(fg,b,yg)6=1. Using Example 17 of GMM it can be checked after some tedious calcu-







It follows that =f;,S,frg,fg,b,ygg as expected. Moreover,
(fyg)=(fbg)=(fgg)=5=7, (fr,g,bg)=(fr,g,yg)=(fr,b,yg)=1,
(fr,gg)=(fr,bg)=(fr,yg)=5=8, (fb,yg)=(fg,yg)=(fg,bg)=1.
That is, ¼ satisﬁes (A)+(Ac)6=1 for any B 2n.
It turns out that Eq. (7) has a simple behavioral characterization:
11Noticethatsuchpreferenceisbiseparable,sothat doesnotdependonthechoiceofx andy and(uxAy)=
(u x0Ay 0)(A) for every x y and x0 y 0.
22Proposition 17 Given an MBA preference ¼ and x,y 2 X such that x  y and given A 2 n,













where for any f 2F we denote by c f one of its certainty equivalents.
We shall see that this result proves useful in characterizing situations in which complement
additivity is a full “marker” for the lack of ambiguity (see, e.g., Proposition 20 below).
We conclude this discussion by observing that the deﬁnition of the set  and some of the
notation and terminology introduced in the previous paragraphs, allow us to provide an al-
ternative characterization of MBis preferences complementing Prop. 9. If there are “enough”
unambiguous events, Savage’s Postulate P4—which is in general weaker than Binary Certainty
Independence—sufﬁces to guarantee that the preference is biseparable. A piece of notation
ﬁrst: Given a set D ba1() and a collection  , denote D( )fP(A):9P 2D,A 2 g.
Proposition 18 Given an MBA preference ¼ with relevant priorsC and unambiguous events ,
suppose thatC() is dense in (0,1). Then the following are equivalent:
(i) there exists a unique capacity  such that eq. (4) holds for any binary act x Ay and any
normalized representation (I,u) of ¼
(ii) ¼ satisﬁes Savage’s P4 axiom. That is, for any A,B 2  and any x,y,x0,y 0 2 X such that
x y and x0 y 0, x Ay ¼x B y iff x0Ay 0 ¼x0 B y 0
5.3 A “fully subjective” Expected Utility model
As observed by Epstein and Zhang (2001), there is an important sense in which Savage’s (1954)
constructionofsubjectiveprobabilityisnot“fullysubjective.” Infact,Savage(andlaterMachina
and Schmeidler (1992), in their extension of Savage’s construction) assumes exogenously that
the probability which represents the decision maker’s beliefs is deﬁned on the whole -algebra
. Examples like Ellsberg’s paradox suggest that a natural extension of Savage’s philosophy
might be to deﬁne probabilities wherever the decision maker feels comfortable, and avoid do-
ing so otherwise, thus making also the domain of the probability charge “subjective.” Ep-
stein and Zhang propose a deﬁnition of unambiguous event, and in the spirit of Machina and
23Schmeidler(1992)provideanaxiomatizationofpreferenceswhoseinducedlikelihoodrelations
are represented by a probability charge on the set of unambiguous events —which under such
axiomatic restrictions (with a minor amendment, see Kopylov (2002)) is a -system. Kopylov
(2002) provides an analogous result using a slightly different set of axioms, generating weaker
structural restrictions on the set of unambiguous events (it is what he calls a “mosaic”).
The results obtained thus far allows us to provide a different “fully subjective” version of
Savage’s model, summarized below (cf. also Nehring (2002, Proposition 1)):12
Proposition 19 If ¼ is an MBA preference on F, then there is a -system of events    such
that ¼ has an SEU representation (with utility u) on the set U of the -measurable acts. That
is, there exist a probability charge P :![0,1] such that for any f ,g 2U,







Moreover, P is uniquely deﬁned on .
We thus conclude that the sets of unambiguous events and acts derived above provide us
with natural “endogenous” domains for a theory of subjective expected utility maximization.
The decision maker assigns sharply deﬁned probabilities only to those events that are revealed
unambiguous by his behavior, assigning interval-valued probabilities to all the other events.
Observe that nothing in our analysis prevents the trivial case  = f;,Sg, in which SEU maxi-
mization never really appears. This is a difference with Epstein and Zhang’s analysis, in which
the set of unambiguous events is very rich by axiomatic requirement on the preferences.
As it is apparent from the statement, there is a sense in which our requirement on prefer-
ences is more stringent than Epstein-Zhang’s. We look for a set of acts on which the preference
¼ satisﬁes the full-blown SEU model of Savage, rather than just being probabilistically sophis-
ticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler. The difference has more than just theoretical
signiﬁcance: The Epstein-Zhang construction is based on a deﬁnition of unambiguous event
which implies that  = , i.e., every event in unambiguous, when the decision maker is proba-
bilistically sophisticated. However, as discussed at length in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), a
12As observed by Kopylov (2002), one can use Zhang’s (2002) deﬁnition of unambiguous event to obtain a “fully
subjective” SEU model, similarly to what we do here. The axiomatics and the sets of unambiguous events being
different, the results are not equivalent.
24probabilisticallysophisticateddecisionmakermightstillbereactingtothepresenceofambigu-
ity. Theonlywaytomakesurethatheisnotistohavea(richenough)collectionofeventswhich
are exogenously known to be unambiguous, as a calibration device. Therefore, the conclusion
that all events are unambiguous to a probabilistically sophisticated decision maker hinges on
an exogenous notion of ambiguity of events which we dispense with.
Aproblemthatiscommontoallsuch“fullysubjective”approachesisthatthedomainofthe
probabilitychargemaybefarfrombeingunique. Thatis,whileoursetiscertainlyunique,itis
not true that one cannot ﬁnd another set of events on which ¼ has an SEU representation. Just
to make a simple example, suppose that ¼ is a CEU preference on a ﬁnite S, and consider any




to uniquely identify it in general.13 There might be a multiplicity of “endogenous domains” for
subjectiveprobability,sothatthechoiceofonemustbemotivatedbyconsiderationsotherthan
just ﬁnding where the decision maker is capable of formulating sharp probabilities.
5.4 Unambiguous events and weak probabilistic sophistication
A result of Marinacci (2002) shows that preferences which have an -MEU representation (with
constant 6=1=2) and are probabilistically sophisticated with respect to a nonatomic prior col-
lapse to SEU as soon as the set of priors used in the representation induces a “nontrivial” 
(see below). Indeed, the result requires an even weaker condition than probabilistic sophis-
tication, as spelled out below. We us the following terminology: A probability P 2 ba1() is
convex-ranged on  if for any B 2  and any  2 [0,P(B)], there exists A  B, A 2  such that
P(A)=.
Deﬁnition 4 A binary relation ¼ on F has weak probabilistic beliefs if there exists a convex-
13A similar observation is made by Kopylov (2002) about his results, although he uses the weaker notion of mo-
saic.
25ranged P 2ba1() and x y such that, for all A,B 2,
P
(A)=P
(B)=)x Ay x B y
Thus, a preference has weak probabilistic beliefs if the indifference sets of the likelihood
relation obtained by considering bets on events (with ﬁxed payoffs x y) contain the level sets
of the probability P. The condition is weaker than probabilistic sophistication, as it does not
require full agreement between the ranking induced by P and the likelihood ordering.14
We show that Marinacci’s result generalizes to a broad class of MBA preferences violating
the constant ambiguity index assumption. It is only needed that ambiguity attitudes over bets
do not ﬂuctuate in an “inconsistent” fashion; that is, that condition (8) holds.
Proposition 20 Let ¼ be an MBA preference with relevant priors C and unambiguous events
. Suppose that ¼ satisﬁes condition (8) for any A 2 n, and that C only contains probability
measures and satisﬁesC()6=f0,1g. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) ¼ has weak probabilistic beliefs.
(ii) ¼ is an SEU preference, whose beliefs are represented by a nonatomic probability mea-
sure P.
Marinacci’s original result is an impossibility statement: under the assumptions of his the-
orem, probabilistic sophistication is compatible with -MEU preferences only in the degener-
ate case of EU preferences. Our extension shows that Marinacci’s result is indeed much more
sweeping than that. In particular, it applies also to CEU preferences. Of course, the discus-
sion in Marinacci (2002) on the importance of the assumptions in the theorem still applies.
In particular, we want to emphasize a simple example of a class of CEU preferences which is
probabilistic sophisticated without being SEU.
14Moreover, probabilistic sophistication imposes further requirements beyond the existence of probabilistic be-
liefs. While the requirement that P be convex-ranged is not strictly speaking part of the deﬁnition of probabilistic
sophistication, all the existing axiomatizations of probabilistic sophistication in a fully subjective setting —ﬁrst
and foremost Machina and Schmeidler (1992)— characterize preferences inducing convex-ranged beliefs.
26Example 6 On a state space (S,), with S at least countably inﬁnite, consider a nonatomic
probabilitymeasureP andastrictlyconvextransformationfunction' :[0,1]![0,1],increasing
and satisfying '(0)=0 and '(1)=1. Then a CEU preference ¼ with (some utility u and) capac-
ity  = '(P) —a subjective Rank-Dependent EU preference— is probabilistically sophisticated
and not SEU. Notice that ¼ is MBA (indeed, invariant biseparable) and satisﬁes condition (7),
since it has   1 by the strict convexity of '. However, it can be checked that for ¼ we have
=f;,Sg, so that there is no nontrivial unambiguous event.
We close by recalling an axiom from GMM which can be employed to ensure that, as in the
assumptions of Proposition 20, all the elements of the set C are probability measures, rather
than charges:
Axiom 8 (Monotone Continuity) For all x,y 2X, if (An) is a sequence in  such that An #; and
if z 2X is such that y z, then y ¼ x An z for some n.
It is immediate to see that Proposition B.1 in GMM extends to MBA preferences, showing
that in the presence of the previous axioms, Monotone Continuity is necessary and sufﬁcient
for C to contain only probability measures.
A Proofs of the results in Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We just prove the necessity part of the statement. Sufﬁciency follows from routine arguments.
Since ¼ satisﬁes Weak Order, Risk Independence, Archimedean, and by Kreps (1988, Theorem
5.11), it follows that there exists a nonconstant and afﬁne function u : X ! R such that x ¼ y if




. We next show that each f in F admits a certainty equivalent.
Claim. For each f 2F there exists x f 2X such that x f  f .
Proof of the Claim. Since f (S) is a ﬁnite subset of X and since ¼ is a Weak Order and it satisﬁes
Monotonicity, it follows that there exist two consequences x1 and x0 in X such that x1 ¼ f ¼x0.
We denote by x = x1 +(1 )x0 for all  2 [0,1]. If either x0  f or x1  f then the statement















Since¼satisﬁesArchimedean, itfollowsthatU and L arenonempty. Moreover, since¼satisﬁes
Weak Order and u is afﬁne, we have that
> 82U,8 2 L. (9)
Deﬁne ¯  = inf2U  and ¯  = sup2L. By (9), it is immediate to see that ¯   ¯ . Since U and L
are nonempty, we have that 1> ¯  ¯  >0. Then, we have three cases:
1. x ¯   f . The statement follows by imposing x f =x ¯ .
2. ¯  2 U. It follows that x ¯   f . Since ¼ satisﬁes Archimedean, it follows that there exists
2(0,1) such that
x¯  =x ¯ +(1 )x0  f ,
thus ¯ 2U and ¯ < ¯ . This is a contradiction with ¯ =inf2U .
3. ¯  62U and x ¯  6 f . Since ¼ satisﬁes Weak Order, it follows that f x ¯ , that is, ¯  2 L. Since
¯   ¯  = sup2L, this implies that ¯  = ¯ . Since ¼ satisﬁes Archimedean, it follows that
there exists 2(0,1) such that
f x1+(1 )x ¯  =x+(1 ) ¯ ,
thus +(1 ) ¯  2 L and ¯  <+(1 ) ¯ . This is a contradiction with ¯  =sup2L. 
Notice that B0(,u (X))=

u  f : f 2F
	





where f 2F and u  f =a.
First, observe that I is well deﬁned. Indeed, pick a 2 B0(,u (X)). Consider f ,g 2 F such that








for all s 2 S. Since u represents ¼
28over X, it follows that f (s)  g (s) for all s 2 S. By Monotonicity, we can conclude that f  g.










Next, consider a,b 2 B0(,u (X)) such that a (s)  b (s) for all s 2S. It follows that there exists
f ,g 2 F such that u  f = a and u  g =b. Since a b and ¼ satisﬁes Monotonicity, it follows
that f ¼ g. Since ¼ satisﬁes Weak Order and u represents ¼ on X, we thus obtain that









Next, we show that I is normalized. Pick k 2 u (X). By assumption, there exists x 2 X such that
u (x) = k. Moreover, if a = k1S, then a = u  f where f = x. Notice that x f can be chosen to be






Pick f ,g 2F. Since ¼ satisﬁes Weak Order and u represents ¼ restricted to X, we have that

















Finally, we are left to prove the continuity of I. First, observe that I (B0(,u (X))) = u (X). Con-
sider a,b 2 B0(,u (X)) such that a  b and I (b) > k where k 2 R. It follows that there exist f
and g in F such that a =u  f and b =u  g. We have two cases:
1. I (a) > k. In this case, B0(,u (X)) 3 b +(1 )a  a for all  2 (0,1). Since I is mono-
tonic, it follows that
I (b +(1 )a) I (a)>k.
2. I (a)  k. Since I (b) > k, we have that there exists k 0 2 u (X) such that I (b) > k 0 > k 
I (a). This implies that there exists x0 2 X such that u (x0) = k 0. By (10), we have that
g  x0  f . Since ¼ satisﬁes Archimedean, it follows that there exists  2 (0,1) such that
g +(1 ) f x0. Since u is afﬁne and by (10), we have that


















It follows that I satisﬁes condition (iv) of C3M Lemma 45. By Proposition 46 of C3M, it fol-
lows that I is lower semicontinuous. Upper semicontinuity follows by a symmetric argument.
The uniqueness part of the statement follows from routine arguments.
29B Proofs of the results in Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Assumethat¼satisﬁesWeakOrder,RiskIndependence,Archimedean,Monotonicity. ByPropo-
sition 1, it follows that ¼ satisﬁes Continuity as deﬁned in C3M.
(i) implies (ii). By C3M (Theorem 3), if ¼ satisﬁes Convexity then there exists a nonconstant
afﬁne function u :X !R and a functionG ? :u (X)ba1()!( 1,1] such that the functional








is well deﬁned and such that















for all (t,P) 2 u (X) ba1(). Fix an act
f 2 F. Consider Pf 2 ba1() such that G ?
R






. Deﬁne t =
R
u  f dP.
Assume that g 2 F is such that
R
u  f dPf 
R


































, that is, f ¼ g. Summing up, if we deﬁne the
binary relation f on F by
f1 f f2 ,
Z
u  f1dP 
Z
u  f2dP
then we have that f f g implies that f ¼ g. Since f was arbitrarily chosen, the statement
follows.
(ii) implies (i). By Proposition 1, it follows that there exists a nonconstant afﬁne function
u : X ! R and a normalized, monotonic, and continuous functional I : B0(,u (X)) ! R such





























u  f dP,P











u  f dP,P

8f 2F.
30Pick f 2F. By assumption, there exists a SEU preference f such that
f f g ) f ¼ g.
In other words, we have that there exists ¯ P 2ba1() such that
Z
u  f d ¯ P 
Z






























u  f dP,P

8f 2F. (11)



















Since G ?(,P) is an increasing function for all P 2 ba1(), it follows that UP (k) is closed under






















, thatis, f +(1 )g ¼ f . Since
f and g were arbitrarily chosen, it follows that ¼ satisﬁes Convexity.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose ¼ is biseparable, so x,y is independent of x,y. Then, for all x,y 2X with x y and all
A 2 , I(u x Ay) = (A)u(x)+[1 (A)]u(y). Furthermore, if x  y, I(u x Ay) = I(u(x)) =
u(x) = (A)u(x) + [1   (A)]u(y); the ﬁrst equality follows from monotonicity. Thus, I(u 
x Ay)=(A)u(x)+[1 (A)]u(y) whenever x ¼y.
Now, for any two binary acts f ,g, we can always choose A,A0 2  so that f = x Ay and
g = x0A0y 0, with x ¼ y and x0 ¼ y 0. Then, for all z 2 X and  2 (0,1], f +(1 )z = (x +(1 
31)z)A(x0 +(1 )z), and so I(u [f +(1 )z]) = (A)u(x +(1 )z)+[1 (A)]u(x0 +
(1 )z)=I(u  f )+(1 )u(z), and similarly for g +(1 )z. Axiom 7 follows.
In the opposite direction, suppose Axiom 7 holds. Fix A 2 and consider the ﬁctitious state
spaceSA =fs,tg acts FA =XSA, and preferences ¼A on FA deﬁned by fA ¼A gA iff fA(s)A fA(t)¼
gA(s)A gA(t) for all fA,gA 2 FA. Then ¼A satisﬁes the GMM axioms and admits a representa-
tion (IA,uA), with IA monotonic, constant-linear and normalized; furthermore, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that uA =u, because ¼A and ¼ agree on constant acts.
Now consider x,y,x0,y 0 2 X with x  y and x0  y 0. There exist , 2 R, with  > 0, such
that u(x)+ = u(x0) and u(y)+ = u(y 0): hence, if fA,gA 2 FA are deﬁned by fA(s) = x,
fA(t)=y, gA(s)=x0 and gA(t)=y 0, we have IA(u gA)=IA(u  fA)+; therefore, if c fA,cgA 2X
are the ¼A–certainty equivalents of fA and gA respectively, u(cgA)=u(c fA)+ as well.
Now c fA A fA iff c fA  x Ay, and similarly cgA A gA iff cgA  x0Ay. It follows that I(u 
x0Ay 0)=u(cgA)=u(c fA)+ =I(u x Ay)+; Eq. (6) and the fact that u(x)+ =u(x0) and
u(y)+ =u(y 0) then imply that x,y(A)=x0,y 0(A).
Hence, a set function  :  ! [0,1] that satisﬁes Eq. (4) can be uniquely deﬁned; it is then
straightforward to verify that  is in fact a capacity.
C Proofs of the results in Sec. 5
Throughout this appendix we write C(A) (resp. C(A)) in place of C(1A0) (resp. C(1A0)). We
also write u  f in lieu of (u  f ). Notice that for expositional reasons, the results are proved
in a different order than that in the main text.
We also make a useful observation. Call reduced an act f such that f (s)  f (s0) implies
f (s) = f (s0). Given any non-reduced act f , we observe that there is a reduced act which, while
beingstate-by-stateindifferentto f ,“simpliﬁes”itbyrestrictingitsrangesothatitonlycontains
non-indifferent payoffs. A ¼-reduction g of f is a reduced act g = fx1,A1;...;xn,Ang, with x1 
x2 ...xn andfA1,...,AngapartitionofS in, suchthat g(s) f (s)foralls 2S. Finally, givena
reduced act f =fx1,A1;...;xn,Ang, withx1 x2 ...xn and fA1,...,Ang a partition ofS in , and
a permutation  of fx1,x2,...,xng, deﬁne the permuted act f as f = f(x1),A1;...;(xn),Ang.
The following lemma is immediately veriﬁed:
32Lemma 21 GivenanMBApreference¼, f isunambiguousifandonlyifthereissome¼-reduction
g of f for which g is crisp for every permutation  of g’s payoffs.
Proof: Note that a ¼-reduction of an act f is a ¼-permutation according to Def. 2. Hence, if f
is unambiguous and g is a ¼-reduction of g, every permutation of g is a ¼-permutation of f ,
and therefore it is crisp. Conversely, let ¯ f be a ¼-permutation of f , and let g be a ¼-reduction
of f for which g is crisp for every permutation . In particular, there is a permutation ¯  such
that g ¯ (s)  ¯ f (s) for all s. By assumption, g ¯  is crisp, so g ¯   x for some x 2 X. But then, by
monotonicity of ¼, also ¯ f  x, i.e. ¯ f is crisp. Thus, f is unambiguous.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 10
Let U 0 be the set deﬁned in the statement of the proposition. More precisely, let U 0 be the
union of all sets V of crisp acts that are closed under ¼-permutations. Notice that, if f is crisp,
the set of all ¼-permutations of f is one such set V , because the ¼-permutation relation is an
equivalence. Furthermore,allconstantsarecrisp;thus,U 0 isbothwell-deﬁnedandnon-empty.
WewillprovethatU =U 0. Webeginwiththeobservationthatanyact f whose¼-permutations
are all crisp must belong to U 0. In fact, if f = 2 U 0, one could add f and all its ¼-permutations
to U 0, thus obtaining a larger set and contradicting the deﬁnition of U 0. Conversely, if f 2 U 0,
then any ¼-permutation of f must be in U 0, hence crisp. This proves that f is unambiguous.
C.2 Proofs of Propositions 12 and 13, and of Corollary 14
A lemma ﬁrst:
Lemma 22 Let a1,a2,...,an,b1,b2,...,bn,c 2 R be such that
Pn
h=1ahb(h) = c for all permuta-
tions  2Per(n). Then either a1 =a2 =...=an or b1 =b2 =...=bn.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exist i,j 2 f1,...,ng such that ai 6= a j and k,l 2
f1,...,ng such that bk 6=bl. Consider a permutation  such that (i) = k and (j) = l, and the
33permutation0 =(kl)obtainedapplying andthenswitchingaroundk andl . Itfollowsthat













whence aibk +a jbl = aibl +a jbk. That is, ai(bk  bl) = a j(bk  bl), which implies ai = a j, a
contradiction. 
C.2.1 Proofs of Propositions 12 and 13.
We prove the two Propositions by showing that the following statements are equivalent for any
A 2:
(i) A 2.
(ii) P(A)=Q(A)=x,y(A) for all P,Q 2C and x y.
(iii) For every x y, the act x Ay is crisp.
(iv) For some x y, the act x Ay is crisp.
(i) ) (ii) : Suppose that A 2 . Therefore, there is f 2 U and x 2 X such that A = fs 2 S :
f (s)  xg. Since f 2 U, there exists a reduction fxi,Aig of f (with xi  xj for every i 6= j) such























Therefore, by the Lemma above, either P(A1) Q(A1) = P(A2) Q(A2) =  = P(An) Q(An) = b





Thereforeb =0andAi satisﬁescondition(ii)foranyforalli =1,2,...,n. AsA 2fAi :i =1,...,ng,
the conclusion follows. In the latter case, n =1 and A =ff xg is then eitherS or ; (depending
on whether x  x1 or not). Clearly P(S) = Q(S) = 1 and P(;) = Q(;) = 0 for any P,Q 2 C, so
that once again (ii) follows, also proving that f;,Sg 2 . Notice ﬁnally that if P(A) =Q(A) for all
P,Q 2C, it then follows from the deﬁnition of x,y that x,y(A)=P(A)=Q(A).
34(ii))(iii): Let x y. Then,
P(u(x Ay))=(u(x) u(y))P(A)+u(y)=(u(x) u(y))Q(A)+u(y)=Q(u(x Ay))
for all P,Q 2C. That is, x Ay is crisp.
(iii))(iv): Obvious.
(iv) ) (i): Let x  y be s.t. x Ay is crisp. We want to show that f = x Ay 2 U. This is the
case if f has a ¼-reduction whose permutations are all crisp. But f is a reduced act, and the
only permutation of f is g =x Ac y. Since f is crisp,
P(u(x Ay))=(u(x) u(y))P(A)+u(y)=(u(x) u(y))Q(A)+u(y)=Q(u(x Ay))






and g is also crisp. Notice that this argument also shows that if A 2, then Ac 2. 
C.2.2 Proof of Corollary 14.
We have proved properties 1 and 2 of a -system in the course of proving the previous two
propositions, so we only need to show property 3. If A,B 2  and A \ B = ;, for all P,Q 2 C,
P(A [ B)=P(A)+P(B)=Q(A)+Q(B)=Q(A [ B), hence A [ B 2. 
C.3 Proofs of Theorem 11 and Corollary 15
UsingthedeﬁnitionofandthecharacterizationofProposition12,thestatementstobeshown
equivalent are reformulated as follows:
(i) f 2U.
(ii) fs 2S : f (s)¼xg2 for all x 2X.
(iii) fs 2S : f (s)xg2 for all x 2X.
(iv) fs 2S :u  f (s)ag2 for all a 2R.
35(v) fs 2S :u  f (s)=ag2 for all a 2R.
(vi) For every ¼-reduction fxi,Aig
n
i=1 of f (with xi 6xj if i 6= j), fA1,A2,...,Ang is a partition of
S in .
(vii) There exist a ¼-reduction fxi,Aig
n
i=1 of f , with fA1,A2,...,Ang a partition of S in  (and
xi 6xj if i 6= j).
The equivalence of (i) and (vii) follows immediately from the argument used to show (i))
(ii) in appendix C.2.1 and from Proposition 13. We shall now prove that statements (ii) (vii)
are equivalent.
(vii) ) (ii): Given f , let g = fxi,Aig
n
i=1 be its ¼-reduction with fA1,A2,...,Ang a partition of
S in  (and xi 6xj if i 6= j), so that u  f =u g =
n
i=1u (xi)1Ai. For all x 2X, fs 2S : f (s)¼xg =
fs 2S : u  f (s)  u(x)g. Hence, fs 2S : f (s) ¼ xg is a disjoint union of elements of , which is a
-system.
(ii) ) (iv): Notice that u(X) is an interval. Let a 2 R. If a 2 u(X), say a = u(x0), then
fs 2 S : u  f (s)  ag = fs 2 S : f (s) ¼ x0g 2 . Else, either a < t for all t 2 u(X), and then
fs 2S :u  f (s)ag=S 2, or a >t for all t 2u(X), and then fs 2S :u  f (s)ag=;2.
(iv) ) (v): Let u  f = 
n
i=1ai1Ai, with fA1,A2,...,Ang a partition of S in  and a1 > a2 >
... > an. If a = 2 fa1,a2,...,ang, then fs 2 S : u  f (s) = ag = ; 2 . The set A1 = fs 2 S :
u  f (s) = a1g = fs 2 S : u  f (s)  a1g 2 . For all i  2, then  3 fs 2 S : u  f (s)  aig =







s 2S :u  f (s)=a j
©
= A1 [A2 [...[Ai. Therefore, for
all i 2, fs 2S :u  f (s)=aig = Ai = (A1[A2[...[Ai) n (A1[A2[...[Ai 1) 2  (remember that
if  is a -system, B,C 2 and C  B imply B nC 2).
(v))(iii): For all x 2X, fs 2S : f (s)xg = fs 2S :u  f (s)=u(x)g2.
(iii) ) (vi): Given f , let g = fxi,Aig
n
i=1 be any one of its ¼-reductions, with fA1,A2,...,Ang
a partition of S in  (and xi 6 xj if i 6= j). W.l.o.g. set x1  x2  ...  xn so that u  f = u  g =

n
i=1u(xi)1Ai and u(x1) > u(x2) > ... > u(xn). Therefore, Ai = fs 2S : u  f (s) = u(xi)g = fs 2S :
f (s)xig2 for all i =1,...,n.
(vi))(vii): Trivial.
36C.4 Proofs of Propositions 16, 17 and 18
C.4.1 Proposition 16






which, since C(Ac)=1 C(A) and C(Ac)=1 C(A), is equivalent to
u(x Ay)(C(A) C(A))+u(x A
c y)(C(A) C(A))+(C(A) C(A))=0
in turn equivalent to
(C(A) C(A))=(u(x Ay)+u(x A
c y))(C(A) C(A))
Therefore, x,y(A)+x,y(Ac)=1 iff either C(A)=C(A) or u(x Ay)+u(x Ac y)=1.
C.4.2 Proposition 17












































































































We begin by recalling that, given a normalized representation (I,u) and x y, x Ay ¼x B y iff
u(x Ay)(C(A) C(A))+C(A)u(x B y)(C(B) C(B))+C(B)
with the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side collapsing to P(A)=C(A)=C(A) (resp. P(B)=C(B)=
C(B)) if A 2 (resp. B 2). Clearly, if there is a unique  for which Eq. (4) holds, u(x Ay) does
not depend on x or y. Hence, the implication (i) ) (ii) is trivial. We prove that (ii) ) (i).
It is enough to show that u(x Ay) = u(x0Ay 0) for every u and x  y, x0  y 0: this implies
that x,y(A) = x0,y 0(A) whenever x  y, x0  y 0, so a set function  :  ! [0,1] that satisﬁes Eq.
(4) can be uniquely deﬁned; it is then straightforward to verify that  is a capacity.
Thus, argue by contradiction, and suppose w.l.o.g. that u(x Ay) > u(x0Ay 0). By the rich-




butthenwehaveaviolationofP4,sincetheﬁrstinequalityimpliesx B y x Ay,andthesecond
implies x0Ay 0 x0 B y 0. Thus, we must have u(x Ay)=u(x0Ay 0). This completes the proof.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 20
The implication (ii) ) (i) being trivial, we prove (i) ) (ii). By weak probabilistic beliefs (as-





Consider now A 2  such that C(A) = C(A) = x,y(A) 2 (0,1). It follows that P(A) 2 (0,1),
since P(A) = 0 (resp. P(A) = 1) implies P(A) = P(;) (resp. P(A) = P(S)), which in turn
implies by (i) that x,y(A)=x,y(;)=0 (resp. x,y(A)=x,y(S)=1), a contradiction.
Let B 2besuchthatP(B)=P(A), sothat(i)impliesx,y(B)=x,y(A)and(sinceP(Bc)=




38where the last equality follows from Proposition 16.
We also know that ¼ satisﬁes condition (8) for any A 2n. It therefore follows from Propo-
sitions 17 and 16 that x,y(B)+x,y(Bc) = 1 implies B 2 , so that x,y(B) = P(B) for any P 2C.




sothatP =P followsfromTheorem2ofMarinacci(2002). SincethisistrueforanyP 2C —that
is, C =fPg— we conclude that ¼ is a SEU preference with probability P.
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